"Knowing how we know" is the subject of this book. Its authors present a new view of cognition that has important social and ethical implications, for, they assert, the only world we humans can have is the one we create together through the actions of our coexistence. Written for a general audience as well as for students, scholars, and scientists and abundantly illustrated with examples from biology, linguistics, and new social and cultural phenomena, this revised edition includes a new afterword (...) by Dr. Varela, in which he discusses the effect the book has had in the years since its first publication. (shrink)

The question of dissolution and maintenance of the state is an aspect of Hobbes’s political philosophy that has not yet received a survey to the same extent and importance usually attributed to other issues pertaining to his political writings. I emphasize in this study the English philosopher’s concern to show that the science of conserving States has the same value and scientific philosophical caliber than the science of building States. The tripartite division of this study aims to investigate first the (...) causes and the characters associated with the dissolution of the state, then the precepts and processes related to the maintenance of the State and, finally, the acts of hostilities (treason and espionage, for example) that need be known and combated by the sovereign representative because someone else affronts and contradicts the security imperative salus populi suprema lex (safety of the people is the supreme law) and the principles of reason that sustain in totum the Hobbesian public architectonic. (shrink)

la82 12.00 Normal 0 21 false false false PT-BR X-NONE X-NONE MicrosoftInternetExplorer4 O presente artigo procura apresentar as linhas gerais da teoria óptica de Hobbes. Antes de examinarmos o desenvolvimento de seus estudos ópticos, porém, faremos um breve resumo de concepções ópticas anteriores na tentativa de situar o leitor no contexto da história da óptica.

O artigo examina a relação entre paixão, democracia e deliberação no pensamento de Hobbes e no de Walzer. São apresentadas as razões pelas quais esses dois pensadores posicionam-se de forma crítica no concernente às deliberações no âmbito de governos democráticos. A relação entre razão e paixão é também examinada no interior do problema central de nosso estudo comparativo.

Nonsense‐mediated RNA decay (NMD) is an evolutionary conserved system of RNA surveillance that detects and degrades RNA transcripts containing nonsense mutations. Given that these mutations arise at a relatively low frequency, are there any as yet unknown substrates of NMD in a wild‐type cell? With this question in mind, Mendell et al.1 have used a microarray assay to identify those human genes under NMD regulation. Their results show that, in human cells, NMD regulates hundreds of physiologic transcripts and not just (...) those containing nonsense mutations. Among the NMD targets are a number of non‐functional RNAs expressed from vestigial sequences derived from retroviral and transposable elements. These findings support the notion that NMD is a high profile post‐transcriptional mechanism micromanaging the activity of multiple gene batteries and suppressing the expression of genetic remnants. BioEssays 27:463–466, 2005. © 2005 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

The article addresses the treatment given to the notion of subject in Slavoj Žižek and Robert Kurz. Without aiming at a synthesis between the two radically opposed positions, they are played against one another in order to reveal the unidimensional stances and false steps in the field of the constitution of the struggle for a concrete negation of capitalist society.

In this paper, the structure of a southeastern Spanish population was studied for the first time with respect to its inbreeding patterns and its relationship with demographic and geographic factors. Data on consanguineous marriages from 1900 to 1969 were taken from ecclesiastic dispensations. Our results confirm that the patterns and trends of inbreeding in the study area are consistent with those previously observed in most non-Cantabrian Spanish populations. The rate of consanguineous marriages was apparently stable between 1900 and 1935 and (...) then sharply decreased since 1940, which coincides with industrialization in Spain. A marked departure from Hardy-Weinberg expectations in the ratio of first cousin to second cousin marriages in the study population was observed. The high levels of endogamy and its significant steadiness throughout the twentieth century is noteworthy. Accordingly, our results show that exogamous marriages were not only poorly represented but also that this reduced mobility suggests that the choice of a mate was preferentially local. We found higher mobility in M22 with respect to M33 cousin mating. The relationships between population size and consanguinity rates and inbreeding fit power-law distributions. A significant positive correlation was observed between inbreeding and elevation. Many Spanish populations have experienced a prolonged and considerable isolation across generations, which has led to high proportions of historical and local endogamy that is associated, in general, with high \ values. Thus, assessing genomic inbreeding using runs of homozygosity in current Spanish populations could be an additional pertinent strategy for obtaining a more refined perspective regarding the population history inferred from the extent and frequency of ROH regions. (shrink)

Proponents of the view that social structures are ontologically distinct from the people in whose actions they are immanent have assumed that structures can stand in causal relations to individual practices. Were causality to be no more than Humean concomitance correlations between structure and practices would be unproblematic. But two prominent advocates of the ontological account of structures, Bhaskar and Giddens, have also espoused a powers theory of causality. According to that theory causation is brought about by the activity of (...) particulars, in the social psychological case, individuals of some sort. Consistence would demand that structure be those individuals. But neither Giddens nor Bhaskar wish to reify structure to the extent that would fit it for a role as a powerful particular. If only human beings can be powerful particulars in these contexts, the only way that structures can be real must be as properties of conversational interactions. Human action is social just in so far as people direct themselves to engage well in joint activities with others. (shrink)

Hebb's conception of instinctive behavior permits the conclusion that it is just not human nature to be instinctive: while the ant brain is built for instinctive behavior, the human brain is built for intelligent behavior. Since drives cannot be instincts, even when a human driver becomes driven, human motives are not instincts either. This understanding allows us to dismiss the determinism of the old instinctivism found in Freud's bio-psychological unconscious, and of the new instinctivism, exemplified by Wilson's sociobiology. The latter (...) entails an explanatory shift from instincts to genes, in which the deterministic character of instincts is carried over to genes. Since genes are not instincts this is a mistake. (shrink)

Beatrice Han has argued that the theories of subjection (determinism: structure) and subjectivation (freedom: agency) are the “the blind spot[s] of Foucault's work.” Furthermore, she continues, as historical and transcendental theories, respectively, Foucault left them in a state of irresolvable conflict. In the Scientific Temptation I have shown that, as a practicing researcher, Foucault encourages us to situate the theories of the subject in the context of his un-thematized search for a metaphysics of realism, the purpose of which was to (...) ground his complementary reach for a possibility of naturalism. In Returning to Kant I now argue that it is this fundamental feature of “Foucault's Foucault” that drives his returns to Kant, the purpose of which was to resolve the conflicting theories of the subject and thereby solve his Giddensian problem of structure and creativity. Locating the returns and their purpose in the context of my own arguments for the recovery of human agency, I argue that Foucault's attempts to solve his Giddensian problem led to two unfortunate solutions. In the first return, his resort to Baudelaire's aesthetic subject is a regression to a pre-noumenal conception of the Kantian subject. With the second return, the reinstatement of the Kantian subject as causally empowered, minus the noumenalism, is nothing more than a reclamation of Kant's conception. I argue that only a reconstruction of Foucault's scientific realism permits us to understand that he could have moved beyond mere reclamation to the actual recovery of human agency. (shrink)

Beatrice Han argues that the theories of subjection (determinism: structure) and subjectivation (freedom: agency) are the “the blind spot of Foucault's work:” to the very end of his life, in being transcendental and historical theories, respectively, they were in irresolvable conflict. In part I, I have argued that Foucault encourages us to situate the theories of the subject in an un-thematized reach for a metaphysics of realism which, in effect, was to ground his uncertain complementary reach for a naturalist conduct (...) of research. In part II I also argue that it is this fundamental feature of Foucault's Foucault that drives his returns to Kant, the purpose of which is to resolve the conflicting theories of the subject, and thus to solve his Giddensian problem of structure and creativity. Locating the returns and their purpose in my context of Science for Humanism and the recovery of human agency, I ultimately argue that Foucault's two special returns to Kant in order to solve his structure/agency problem led to two unfortunate solutions. The resort to Baudelair's aesthetic subject is a failed solution in so far as it regresses to being a pre-noumenal conception of the subject. The subsequent mere reinstatement of Kant's subject as causally empowered, minus the noumenalism, is nothing more than a reclamation of Kant's conception. Only the reconstruction of Foucault's realism permits us to assert that he could have moved beyond the reclamation of human agency to its recovery. (shrink)

For some of us, the defeasibility theory of knowledge remains the most plausible approach to the Gettier Problem. Epistemological fashion and faded memories notwithstanding, persuasive objections to the theory are very hard to find. The most impressive of those objections to the theory that have hitherto gone unanswered are examined and rejected here. These are objections put forward by Richard Feldman, Richard Foley, and John Turri. While these are all interesting, the objection recently put forward by Turri is, we think, (...) by far, the most serious threat to the theory that we have seen in a long time. A successful reply to it requires a surprising amount of care, as it turns out. If tenable, Turri's objection deals a devastating blow to the theory developed by Roderick Chisholm, Keith Lehrer, Peter Klein, Marshall Swain, Risto Hilpinen, John Pollock, and Paul Moser, among others. Under scrutiny, however, the threat proves illusory. It results from inattention to a crucial, but relatively subtle, aspect of.. (shrink)

This paper proposes a dynamic theory of embodiment that aims to get beyond the absent moving body in embodied social theory. The first somatic revolution, inspired by Merleau Ponty, provided theories based on the feeling and experience of the body. The theory of dynamic embodiment focuses instead on the doing itself as embodied social action, in which the embodied person is fore-grounded as a complex resource for meaning making. This represents a theoretical enrichment of the earlier turn to the body (...) in social theory, which tended to separate the semiotic, as necessarily representational and/or linguistic, from the somatic as a wide range of corporeal processes and practices assumed to be separated from mind, language and/or conscious thought. We argue that overcoming this persistent Cartesianism requires a New Realist approach to the proper location of human agency as a causal power, one that promotes a bio-psycho-social concept of personhood. Part one of the paper presents a general framework for this perspective, while part two applies this paradigm ethnographically to illustrate how bringing semiosis and somatics together requires a robust conception of multi-sensory modalities. (shrink)

The phenomenon of size constancy is defined as the apparent perceptual invariance of the linear dimensions of a seen object as this approaches the eye or recedes from it. It has been interpreted as resulting from the application by the brain of a size correction, made possible by the subject's apprehension of distance cues present in the image. We present several observations which, by dissociating accommodation from distance of the seen object and by suppressing the optic effects of accommodation on (...) the visual image itself, show that this interpretation is incorrect, and that in fact the size correction of the visual image is a function of the central effort of accommodation, not of the distance of the seen object. (shrink)

Peer review is a widely accepted instrument for raising the quality of science. Peer review limits the enormous unstructured influx of information and the sheer amount of dubious data, which in its absence would plunge science into chaos. In particular, peer review offers the benefit of eliminating papers that suffer from poor craftsmanship or methodological shortcomings, especially in the experimental sciences. However, we believe that peer review is not always appropriate for the evaluation of controversial hypothetical science. We argue that (...) the process of peer review can be prone to bias towards ideas that affirm the prior convictions of reviewers and against innovation and radical new ideas. Innovative hypotheses are thus highly vulnerable to being “filtered out” or made to accord with conventional wisdom by the peer review process. Consequently, having introduced peer review, the Elsevier journal Medical Hypotheses may be unable to continue its tradition as a radical journal allowing discussion of improbable or unconventional ideas. Hence we conclude by asking the publisher to consider re-introducing the system of editorial review to Medical Hypotheses. (shrink)

We propose a semiotic framework to underpin a posthumanist philosophy of education, as contrasted to technological determinism. A recent approach to educational processes as semiotic phenomena lends itself as a philosophy to understand the current interplay between education and technology. This view is aligned with the transhumanist movement to defend techno-scientific progress as fundamental to human development. Particularly, we adopt a semiotic approach to education to tackle certain tensions in current debates on the human. Transhumanism scholars share the optimistic belief (...) that there is no limit to how the ethical use of technology can help alleviate suffering and increase our health and wisdom. From this perspective, it appears possible to acquire capacities that require rethinking the notion of human altogether. For others, this undermining of essentialist concepts of humanity entails serious risks, especially related to ethical egalitarianism. We adopte the perspective of edusemiotics, a framework that brings together semiotics, educational theory and philosophy of education. As a theoretical-practical framework, edusemiotics affords a hermeneutic and semiotic method for our approach. Peirce’s logic of signs is used to analyze socio- educational interactions as environmental. We observe two lines of thought. On the one hand, technological transhumanism enhances Cartesian mind–body dualism. On the other hand, philosophical posthumanism seeks to overcome this dichotomy. The former proposal construes human transformation as an artifactualization derived from techno-scientific enhancements. The latter position proposes an integrative posthumanism, capable not only to include edusemiotic theory but also to rethink the concept of learning as mutual to that of human. (shrink)

Aristóteles parece negar el estatuto ontológico de los artefactos que no serían sustancias. Se analizan los textos básicos al respecto y sus principales interpretaciones. Se discute la opinión de R. Katayama, para mostrar que acierta en remarcar la importancia de la separabilidad de los compuestos, pero se equivoca en la noción de separación. Se sostiene que las formas no son separables de sus compuestos tanto naturales como artefactos, pero los primeros poseen un tipo de separación de otras formas o especies (...) que no poseen los segundos y, por ello, son substancias. Aristotle seems to deny the ontological status of artifacts which are not substances. In this paper I discuss the basic regarding this topic and its main intepretations. I discuss R. Katayama's opinion to show that he is right to underline the importance of the trait of separation, but he is wrong regarding the the notion of separation. My thesis is that neither the forms of natural things nor those of artifacts are separable from the composites, but the former possess a different kind of separation from other forms or species, which the latter do not possess. Hence, the former are substances. (shrink)

There is a constructive method to define a structure of simple k -cyclic Post algebra of order p , L p , k , on a given finite field F ( p k ), and conversely. There exists an interpretation Φ 1 of the variety $${\mathcal{V}(L_{p,k})}$$ generated by L p , k into the variety $${\mathcal{V}(F(p^k))}$$ generated by F ( p k ) and an interpretation Φ 2 of $${\mathcal{V}(F(p^k))}$$ into $${\mathcal{V}(L_{p,k})}$$ such that Φ 2 Φ 1 ( B ) (...) = B for every $${B \in \mathcal{V}(L_{p,k})}$$ and Φ 1 Φ 2 ( R ) = R for every $${R \in \mathcal{V}(F(p^k))}$$. In this paper we show how we can solve an algebraic system of equations over an arbitrary cyclic Post algebra of order p, p prime, using the above interpretation, Gröbner bases and algorithms programmed in Maple. (shrink)

The basis of the paper is a logic of analytical consequential implication, CI.0, which is known to be equivalent to the well-known modal system KT thanks to the definition A → B = df A ⥽ B ∧ Ξ (Α, Β), Ξ (Α, Β) being a symbol for what is called here Equimodality Property: (□A ≡ □B) ∧ (◊A ≡ ◊B). Extending CI.0 (=KT) with axioms and rules for the so-called circumstantial operator symbolized by *, one obtains a system CI.0*Eq (...) in whose language one can define an operator ↠ suitable to formalize context-dependent conditionals (so to counterfactual conditionals) via the definition (Def ↠) A ↠ B = df *A ⥽ B ∧ Ξ (Α, Β).. The central problem of the paper is to identify inside CI.0*Eq + Def ↠ a set of axioms yielding the fragment consisting of all and only theorems in which only truth-functional operators and the two operators → and ↠ occur. This system, here called CI.0, is introduced in §3. In view of the intended purpose, it is introduced a complete and tableau-decidable system KTw, which is an extension of KT with axioms for the so-called quasi-variables w(A), w(B)… Three translation functions among the three languages used in the paper are then introduced. The first, Tr, maps every wff of form *A into wffs of form w(A) ∧ A and translates theorems of CI.0*Eq into theorems of KTw. The second, t°, translates theorems of CI.0 into theorems of CI.0*Eq by applying Def↠. A third one, t, translates theorems of CI.0 into theorems of KTw. As a consequence, it follows that t°A = TrtA. In §4 it is proved that CI.0 is complete w.r.t. the class of CI.0-models of form where f is a selection function and R an access relation. It is then proved (i) that CI.0 models may be converted into KTw-models; (ii) that the truth-value of a proposition in a world of a CI.0-model is preserved in the same world of the derived KTw-model; (iii) that A is a CI.0-thesis iff its translation tA is KTw-thesis. It follows that, if A is not a CI.0-thesis, tA is not a KTw-thesis, so also that TrtA is not a CI.0*Eq-thesis. Since t°A = TrtA and t°A is a function built on Def↠, this proves that every t°-translation of a CI.0-wff that is a CI.0*Eq-theorem is a CI.0-theorem. Since the converse proposition is proved in §2, their conjunction establishes the desired result. In the final section, it is proved that CI.0 is tableau-decidable, that ↠ is not a trivial operator and that ↠ enjoys the positive and negative properties required in §1 for context-dependent conditionals. Some final remarks suggest that studying the relations between CI.0 and systems of classical conditional logic may be a promising line of investigation. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Journal of Aesthetic Education 40.1 (2006) 35-53 [Access article in PDF] "Truth Is What Works": Francisco J. Varela on Cognitive Science, Buddhism, the Inseparability of Subject and Object, and the Exaggerations of Constructivism—A Conversation Francisco J. Varela Bernhard Poerksen Institut für Journalistik und Kommunikationswissenschaft Universität Hamburg Francisco J. Varela (1946-2001) studied biology in Santiago de Chile, obtained his doctorate 1970 at Harvard University with a (...) dissertation on the insect eye, and worked there for some time in the laboratory of Torsten Wiesel, the later Nobel Laureate for medicine. From his scientific beginnings as a researcher in biology, he not only studied and practiced biology but, resisting the dominating mainstream, pursued a research program that ignored and broke down traditional disciplinary boundaries. This research program is best characterized as experimental epistemology, a concept introduced by the neuropsychiatrist and cybernetician Warren S. McCulloch. Francisco J. Varela's great aspiration was to examine and answer the philosophical ur-question of cognition with scientific precision and with the help of the best possible theoretical framework. [End Page 35]Having obtained his doctorate, he went back to Chile to work as a professor of biology together with Humberto R. Maturana. He contributed to the writing of the theory of autopoiesis, which was to cause a furor in the world of science as a universally applicable explanatory model. After the overthrow of Allende and the installation of the dictatorship by the putsch general Pinochet, Francisco J. Varela first escaped to Costa Rica, then became a professor at the American University of Colorado and University of New York, and finally returned in 1980 to the University of Chile in Santiago for five years. Temporary positions as guest professor for neurobiology, philosophy, and cognitive science in Germany, Switzerland, and France led him to Paris in the end, where he worked as research director of the Centre National de Recherche Scientifique until his death on May 28, 2001.In his research work embracing cognitive science, evolutionary theory, and immunology, Francisco J. Varela, constantly inspired by his fundamental interest in the key questions of epistemology, gave the epistemological debate a new orientation. In his thinking he refuses to accept the strict separation of subject and object, of knower and known, which as a rule unites realists and constructivists alike. Francisco J. Varela rejects the fundamental dualism dividing mind and world, which had shaped Western philosophy from its earliest beginnings. He does not subscribe to the idea that human individuals can invent their own realities—blindly and arbitrarily, and without experiencing any resistance from the external world and all other things given. He equally distances himself, however, from the diametrically opposite position that overstates the eigenpower of the world of objects. The external world and all other things given cannot determine what happens in an organism. Varela's claim is that individual and world create each other. The Computational Model of the Mind Poerksen: The ancient key questions of philosophy are at the center of modern cognitive science. What is the essence of the mind? Do our conceptions represent a given world, which is independent from our minds? What is the formative power of external objects over our perceptions? How does cognition function? The search for an adequate answer and an improved understanding of the human mind has led many cognitive scientists to entertain the assumption that the brain is actually a kind of computer. Memory is taken to be a store. Thinking and perceiving are understood as data processing in the sense that an independent external world is computationally transformed into symbols and represented in the organism in this manner. You are very critical of this view. Why?Varela: If the brain is considered as a kind of computer, then cognitive research is limited to discovering certain self-sufficient shapes—the symbols—together with the rules [End Page 36] governing them—the programs. But this search for symbols and programs will never be profitable because it... (shrink)

Supersubstantivalism, the view that material objects are identical to their locations, has recently been defended in metaphysics and philosophy of physics. One of the most powerful arguments in its favour is the so-called argument from harmony. There is a certain harmony between material objects and their locations. Necessarily, if material object x is located at a spherical region, x is spherical. Necessarily, if material object x is located at region r, any part of x is located at a part of (...) r. Supersubstantivalism offers a straightforward explanation of such harmony. By contrast, dualism, the view that material objects are distinct from their locations, does not offer any explanation and should regard harmony principles as unexplained coincidences. In this paper I put forward a theory, which I shall call the ‘Inheritance Theory’, that does provide a straightforward explanation of harmony on behalf of dualists. (shrink)

In the 18th century, the pre-modern Judeo-Greco-Christian problem of freedom and determinism is transformed by Kant into the modern problem of the freedom of human agency in the natural and cultural worlds of deterministic structures; it is this version of the freedom and determinism issue which centres the Science and Humanism debates, and thus marks the history of the social sciences. Anthony Giddens is credited with providing the new vocabulary of ‘structure’ and ‘agency’ in order to formulate the problem of (...) freedom and determinism in those terms, thus making this formulation fruitful. In this book, Charles R. Varela proposes that Kant originally formulated this problem, and makes a series of wide-ranging and groundbreaking observations based on Kant's metaphysics of realism which enables Varela to propose a solution to the structure/agency problem. Subjects revisited in this book include: · "Giddens’ Call" · The stalemate of the social and psychological sciences · The determinist tradition of modern science · Postmodernism This breadth of themes, drawn together by Varela with his work on Kant, fully realizes Giddens’ principle that human agency is a real causal force. It is Kant's conception of causal power that is the causal force Giddens' has called for. _Science For Humanism: The Recovery of Human Agency_ will be of particular interest to students of humanism and therefore realism, Kant and Giddens. (shrink)

o problema dos universais pode ser posta sob a forma de uma pergunta muito simples: "Existem universaisT' Essa perguuta supOe que tenhamos claro 0 que entendemos por universais. Um bom caminho para se chegara talescJarecimento econcebe-Ios, como PIat40 mesmo 0 fazia, como os objetos a serem designados por termos gerais em sua forma no.l' ,-~ n....&:cados " -' '--"" ...c. •..IA-' • " podemnuna JZuua. .r.~ como ...... UUUI, ...... lUOl;;llUCO a... , tomar a forma de DOmes como "0 bern. (...) ", "0 identico ", 0 que supostamente os evidenciacomo termos designadores de universais. Com isso a pergunta "Existem universaisT' pode ser mais precisamente formulada como: "Existem designata prOprios para as nossas nominaJiza~ de termos gerais r Para essa pergunta podemos ter, a grosso modo, duas respostas: "sim", que ea resposta do realista; "0.10", que ea resposta do nominaJista. Essas respostas definem, nIo importa 0 que se aerescente, as duas altemativas basicas. (shrink)

There is a constructive method to define a structure of simple k-cyclic Post algebra of order p, L p,κ, on a given finite field F, and conversely. There exists an interpretation Ф₁ of the variety V generated by L p,κ into the variety V) generated by F and an interpretation Ф₂ of V) into V such that Ф₂Ф₁ = B for every B ϵ V and Ф₁₂ = R for every R ϵ V). In this paper we show how we (...) can solve an algebraic system of equations over an arbitrary cyclic Post algebra of order p, p prime, using the above interpretation, Gröbner bases and algorithms programmed in Maple. (shrink)

We review and discuss A. H. Louie’s book “More than Life Itself: A Reflexion on Formal Systems and Biology” from an interdisciplinary viewpoint, involving both biology and mathematics, taking into account new developments and related theories.

This article presents our experience as a multidisciplinary team systematizing and analyzing the transcripts from a large-scale (1.775 conversations) series of conversations about Chile’s future. This project called “Tenemos Que Hablar de Chile” [We have to talk about Chile] gathered more than 8000 people from all municipalities, achieving gender, age, and educational parity. In this sense, this article takes an experiential approach to describe how certain interdisciplinary methodological decisions were made. We sought to apply analytical variables derived from social science (...) theories and operationalize them through modern linguistics to guide a more theoretically informed natural language processing. The analysis was divided into three stages: (1) a descriptive analysis adapting descriptions of computational grounded theory, (2) a futurization analysis operationalizing concepts from futures studies, and (3) an argumentative analysis operationalizing concepts from argumentation theory. Overall, our methodological experimentation shed light on potential learnings for integrating a multidisciplinary perspective on NLP analysis with sensitive social content. Firstly, we developed a strategy for translation of knowledge based on the construction of what we called "analytical categories” in which a normative expectation or descriptive dimension was identified in the body of literature, operationalized through linguistics, and programmed in Python or R. Ultimately, we seek to reflect on the importance interdisciplinarity not only as means to find new analysis ideas but rather, to incorporate the critical, political and epistemological points of view to understand analysis as complex socio-technical processes. (shrink)

Este trabalho objetivou avaliar o tipo de reação à frustração e os sentimentos agressivos em presidiários. Verificou-se, também, a relação de dependência entre o tipo de delito (furto, roubo, sequestro, homicídio, latrocínio e outros) e o construto agressividade, por meio do teste de Frustração de R..

Context: At the conference “The Ethical Meaning of Francisco Varela’s Thought,” which took place on 28 May 2011 in Sassari, Italy, Humberto Maturana, Michel Bitbol, and Pier Luigi Luisi participated in two discussions. Purpose: In this edited transcription of the discussions, the participants talk about several aspects of autopoiesis, the observer, ontology, making distinctions and distinguishing different domains, perception and illusion, and transcendence. Results: The discussions shed light on how constructivist concepts are perceived by individual authors. Concepts such as (...) “transcendence” and “objectivity” are understood in different ways. Constructivist content: The concepts discussed are highly relevant for constructivist approaches. (shrink)